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 6 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this analysis and recommendations is to propose ways in which Montenegro’s 
Law on Free Access to Information (LFATI) could be amended to ensure fuller respect for the 
right of access to information. The LFATI adopted in November 2005 has already proved its value 
in ensuring that information that was not previously public in Montenegro has entered the public 
domain. This includes information related to privatization of state companies, and basic 
budgetary and structural information about the security services.  
 
There are however, a number of provisions of the law that are still unclear, confused or 
contradictory, and fall short of international standards. These include the provisions on copies 
and on costs, the need to appoint establishment of information officers in each public body, and 
the need to clarify and elaborate timeframes. There are also some typical elements of ensuring 
the right to information that are absent from this law and would greatly enhance its 
effectiveness, both for requestors and for the administration. These include the duty to assist 
requestors, the proactive provision of information, greater detail on personal data protection, 
elaboration of the right to environmental information, and the establishment of an Information 
Commissioner.  
 
In conducting this analysis, we have been guided by established international standards, 
including the provisions of the ICCPR and ECHR, and the Recommendation 2002(2) of the 
Council of Europe on Access to Official Documents. We have also drawn on comparative law and 
jurisprudence, particularly that from the member countries of the European Union.  
 
International law has clearly established not only a right of access to information but a positive 
obligation on government to respect that right and take measures to ensure that information is 
available to the public. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, ruling in the case of Claude 
Reyes et al vs. Chile confirmed:  
 
 “the right of all individuals to request access to State-held information …[and]  the right 
of the individual to receive such information and the positive obligation of the State to 
provide it, so that the individual may have access to such information or receive an 
answer that includes a justification when, for any reason permitted by the Convention, 
the State is allowed to restrict access to the information in a specific case [Claude Reyes 
et al vs. Chile, paragraph 77 of judgment of 19 September 2006]. 
 
In conformity with this it is positive that the Montenegrin Law on Free Access to Information 
clearly states at Article 1 paragraph 3 that the right shall be guided by international human rights 
law. This provision is important as it should guide the court in their interpretation of the law (as 
has already happened in at least one Supreme Court ruling) and should assist drafters in their 
reworking of the law.  
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1.1.  Provisions of the Law that Uphold the Right to Information 
 
In line with Montenegro’s obligations under international human rights law the LFATI contains a 
number of well-drafted provisions of principle that clearly establish the right to information. 
These include:  
• The principle of publicity of government-held information (Article 1, paragraph 1 and Article 
2.1); 
• That principle that everyone (all legal and natural persons) may request information (Article 
1, paragraph 2; Article 4.5); 
• The principle of non-discrimination against those who exercise their right to information 
(Article 2.2); 
• The right of access – barring application of legitimate exceptions – to all information held by 
public bodies (Article 1 paragraph 2, Article 4.1)  
• A definition of public bodies that includes all bodies performing public functions or operating 
with public funds (Article 4.3).  
• The principle of ensuring easy exercise of the right, summed up by the Council of Europe 
Recommendation 2002(2) at Principle V which states that  “Formalities for requests should 
be kept to a minimum.”. The Montenegrin law respects this in principle in Article 2.3 and 2.4;  
• The principle that access to information should be prompt (Article 2.4) and the timeframes 
established by the law (8 days for an initial decision) is in line with comparative standards. 
 
As we note in subsequent sections, however, some of these principles are not upheld by the 
detailed procedural provisions of the law. For example, although as we note at Section 4 below, 
there are in fact problems with the access provisions of the law as far as the right to copies is 
concerned.  
 
1.2.  Responsible Officials and the Duty to Assist  
 
The LFATI contains in the definitions provision (Article 4) a reference to the “responsible person” 
for acting upon requests for information. The law also requires all public bodies to publish “the 
names of the persons authorized to act upon any request for the information” (Article 5). These 
provisions do not, however, provide a clear requirement that every public body appoint at least 
one person responsible for handling requests for information. The majority of access to 
information laws required that at least one person in each public body be nominated as the 
Information Officer responsible for receiving and following requests for information and for 
ensuring that information is delivered to the requestor within the timeframes established by law 
as well as ensuring compliance with other provisions of the law, such as proactive publication of 
material and keeping statistics on the number of requests and on the information delivered. 
 
Such a person should always be different from the spokesperson of the entity as the function is 
quite different.  In larger institutions, this should be a dedicated person, and in the largest 
central government bodies, more than one person should be appointed. In all cases, a deputy or 
substitute should also be nominated to ensure that when the Information Officer is out of the 
office for more than one day (meetings, travel, vacation, sick leave) there is a someone who is 
available to handle requests).  
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The public body should be obliged to publish the names, e-mails and office phone numbers of 
both the Information Office and the substitute on their website, in other public places, and in all 
materials it produces about the right of access to information.  
 
We also note that the existence of an Information Officer does not imply any lessening of the 
ultimate responsibility held by the head of the body for compliance with the law. Nevertheless, 
the Information Officer should be empowered to take decisions on the release of information, 
especially routine information (See Section 8) , without the need to consult with senior officials. 
Indeed, some laws require that only decisions to refuse information should require internal 
discussion and a formal decision and decisions to release information should be more automatic. 
 
Another function of the Information Officer is to provide assistance to requestors seeking 
information. We note that Article 17 permits public bodies to request clarifications from 
requestors as to the nature of their requests, but fails to require that they be assisted in 
formulating the requests so as to be sufficiently clear for the public authority to be able to act on 
them. We note that the Council of Europe Recommendation 2002(2) clearly states and Principle 
VI.5:  
 The public authority should help the applicant, as far as possible, to identify the requested 
official document, but the public authority is not under a duty to comply with the request if it is 
a document which cannot be identified. 
 
The LFATI contains the second part of this principle, but fails to include the first part. This should 
be rectified. If the requestor believes that the request is sufficiently clear, the public authority is 
under an obligation to accept this and to endeavour to process the request. The lack of clarity of 
the request should only be the grounds for a rejection after a demonstrable effort by the 
authority to help the requestor identify the information and a good faith effort to answer the 
request. 
 
The powers of the Information Officer include taking a decision to release information without 
the absolute obligation to consult with the head of the body or other official. It is recommended, 
however, that they do not have the right to refuse information and that the decision to refuse 
information be taken by either the head of the institution (who in any case has legal 
responsibility for the decision), or by a nominated committee of senior officials.  
 
 
Recommendations 
 
• Introduce a clear provision requiring each public body to nominate an official responsible for 
the access to information process (the “Information Officer”) and to publish his/her name on 
the website as well as office phone and e-mail address, and mailing address for sending 
requests.  
• A deputy/substitute information officer should be nominated and his/her name and contact 
details also made available to the public.  
• Introduce to the law a provision establishing a duty to assist requestors. The duty should 
include helping all requestors formulating requests, helping requestors identify the correct 
body for filing requests, and helping disabled and illiterate requestors set down requests in 
writing. Failure to provide such assistance should considered a breach of the LFATI and 
subject to a penalty imposed on the institution.  
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1.3.  Requests for Information: Written and Oral  
 
The law establishes provisions on requesting information that are broadly line with international 
and comparative standards. It is positive that the requestor does not have to pay a fee for 
accessing the information and it is implied (although not explicitly stated) that they do not need 
to provide reasons for asking for the information.  
 
With respect to the information that the requestor must provide, it is positive that the requestor 
only has to provide a basic description of the information required as well as the optionally any 
additional information that may help identify the data they are looking for. It is also positive that 
the authority may not impose a form for requesting information.  
 
On the other hand the law requires that the requestor provides basic data about him or herself, 
(name and address). We recommend that an e-mail address should be sufficient for requests 
submitted by e-mail.  
 
The law permits requests in writing on paper or by e-mail, but unfortunately does not permit oral 
requests. We recommend oral requests when the requestor is asking for any information that 
should or may be available immediately (see section on proactive publication of information). For 
instance, a requestor should be able to walk into a government body and ask verbally for 
information such as an annual report without the necessity to fill in a request. Similarly, it should 
be possible to ask for the same information by telephone and have it mailed. Only in cases where 
the information is not immediately available or where the information would take time to compile 
in order to answer the request should the requestor be obliged to set down the enquiry on 
paper.  
 
In particular the right to file oral requests should apply to all handicapped requestors for whom 
writing is a problem. Similarly those who are illiterate or with low levels of literacy should have 
the right to file oral requests. In these cases, the Information Officer or other official attending to 
the public should have the obligation to set the request down for them in writing.  
 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
 That the law be amended to make clear that an e-mail address is sufficient for answering 
requests. 
 That oral requests be permitted when requesting information that should be available 
proactively or free of charge (see Section 8 on Proactive Publication / Routine Information) 
 That law should establish oral requests for those who are handicapped or have low levels of 
literacy. The law should make clear that in such cases the Information Officer or other 
official should set the information down in writing for the requestor.  
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1.4. Forms of Access 
 
One of the deficiencies of the drafting of the law which has already caused significant problems 
is the lack of clarity over the forms of accessing the information once the request has been 
granted. The law at Article 12.2 clearly allows the requestor to specify the form of access 
(meaning the format in which the information is contained) and Article 13 establishes the options 
for receiving the information (inspection, transcription, copies). Article 13 also establishes that in 
cases of partial access, only copies will be permitted as clearly inspection will not be an option, 
which is acceptable. However, Article 18 paragraph 5 opens the door to the government agency 
to make an resolution on access that limits access to inspection only.  
 
These provisions have lead to problems in practice with some institutions asserting a right to 
offer inspection of documents only (which lead to some severe problems in practice for 
requestors seeking information that was clearly in the public interest when they were not allowed 
even to transcribe key data, nor to take photos or make voice notes during the inspection).  
 
The Supreme Court decided on this matter in its ruling of 19 December 2006 (Supreme Court of 
the Republic of Montenegro, ref. 83/2006) which stated that:   
 The provision of Article 13 of the Law on Free Access to Information stipulates the manner 
for exercising the right to access information where one of the envisaged possibilities is to 
have direct inspection of public records, the original or the copy of the information, at the 
premises of the given authority. This, however, does not imply the arbitrariness of the 
authority to stipulate the manner of access at own discretion. The authority has the primary 
obligation to consider the possibility for the exercise of this right in the manner stated in the 
request.” 
 
The Supreme Court ruling is consistent with international law, which provides a right to “seek, 
receive and impart” information. Reception and imparting would clearly be hindered by not 
having a copy of the information. Such an interpretation echoes comparative standards where 
the majority of laws permit requestors to obtain a copy of the documents that contain the 
requested information. Indeed, the problem that arose in Montenegro is rather perverse in that 
the usual problem is with inspection of originals because of cases in which such inspection could 
damage historic documents.  
 
If a public body lacks the facilities for making photocopies of all the information requested, it 
should be under an obligation to make arrangements with another public body to produce such 
copies. The need for such external support in producing copies may never be a reason for either 
denial of the request or for extension of the time-period in which access must be given. 
 
It is positive that the law establishes (Article 7) that those with disabilities should be provided 
with information in the form that they can use it and that the public body may not require them 
to pay fee for this conversion (Article 12, paragraph 2).  
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Recommendations 
 
 That the law be amended to make clear that there is a right of copies to documents 
 That the law make clear that inspection is almost always an option in addition to the right to 
receive copies but that they are not mutually exclusive (ie: a requestor may ask to see 
originals in situ and then request copies).  
 That the law make clear the obligation on public bodies to find a solution to the copying 
problem.  
 Amend Article 18 paragraph 5 to make clear that access by inspection or transcription will be 
only when requested by the applicant. The law should retain the unlimited timeframe for 
exercising such access.  
 
  
1.5. Time Frames 
 
The 8 calendar-day timeframe for responding to requests established by Article 16 is in line with 
international standards on access to information. In practice, if the last day of a deadline falls on 
a non-working day, the day for provision of the response would be the first subsequent working 
day. However, when calculating the deadlines, non-working days are included in the count. 
 
It is also positive that there is a 48-hour time limit for emergency information (as per the rules 
noted above, if a request were filed on a Friday afternoon, the response would be due on the 
Monday).  
 
We note that the timeframe comes into force from the day the request was received by the 
authority. In the case of hand delivered requests, this will be clear as there should be some 
receipt given for the request with a reference number. In the case of requests submitted by post 
(registered or otherwise) and by e-mail, we recommend that the authority be obliged to issue a 
receipt note (a letter or e-mail containing a registration number) in order to confirm the receipt 
date and to facilitate subsequent tracking of the request.  
 
Article 18 paragraph 4 provides that once a decision on access has been reached, access shall be 
provided within three calendar days in the case of copies being provided (Article 18, paragraph 5 
establishes an unlimited timeframe for inspection). The means that maximum time-frame for 
access shall be 11 calendar days from the filing of the request.  
 
We note that Article 15 requires that requests be treated “in a summary procedure” and note 
that while this is a good principle for putting in the opening provisions of the law, its location in 
Article 15 is perhaps redundant.  
 
The extension for voluminous requests of up to 15 calendar days is reasonable and fits with 
comparative standards on timeframes. The law should,however,contain an obligation that if such 
an extension is to be applied,the requestor should be notified within the initial 8 days established 
by law for responses, and they must be informed about how long the extension will be and must 
be provided with a clear written justification as to why the extension is being applied.  
 
Clarifications: Another timeframe is established in the Article 17 provision on “eliminating 
deficiencies” from requests (we recommend “clarifications” as a better terminology in English). 
This provision says that if the request is incomplete or unclear, the public body can require the 
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requestor to clarify within 8 calendar days. The timeframe for answering such a clarified request 
appears to be the same as for initially submitted requests, so 8 calendar days (although Article 
17 paragraph 3 is not completely clear, at least in the English translation).  
 
The law fails, however, to stipulate the timeframe for the body to contact the requestor. We 
presume that it might be the 8 days initially given for response but we believe this is too long 
and strongly recommend that this should be a short time-frame, for example 3 calendar days. 
The requestor should then be at liberty to submit a reformulated request at the time of her or 
her own choosing, and once the request is received, the public body has 8 days for answering.  
 
Timeframes and Basis  for Appeals: It is positive that when an appeal is submitted, the first 
level institution (against which the appeal is made), has just 3 days to prepare their case (Article 
21) and to transfer the appeal to the responsible second-level institution together will all related 
documents. The second level then in turn has to make a decision within 15 days of the 
submission of the complaint (Article 22). These are suitable deadlines for the important matter of 
an appeal against a refusal or failure to release information.  
 
We note however that the law at Article 20 establishes that an appeal may be made against “any 
document … deciding upon any request for information”. The law should be amended to make 
clear that administrative silence may also be appealed and that if the requestor has not heard 
anything from the entity within 8 days of submission of the requests (or an additional 15 days if 
an extension was notified by the agency) then there an automatic right of appeal. The law 
should also establish whether administrative silence is positive or negative. We note that in some 
countries the access to information law establishes administrative silence as positive (something 
common in Administrative Law), which facilitates an immediate appeal to the Information 
Commissioner which in turn can order the immediate release of the document. Other FOI laws 
qualify administrative silence as negative (sometimes going against the norm of Administrative 
Law)  in order to provide legal grounds for an immediate appeal against the failure to respond to 
the request.  
 
 
Recommendations 
 
 We recommend that the law be amended to require that in the case of extensions being 
applied,the public body must notify the requestor within 8 calendar days and must inform the 
requestor of the reasons for the extension and the length of it (not all extensions will be for 
15 days:each extension needs to be justified and some may warrant only a few extra days). 
 There are some additional timeframes that are common in other access to information laws 
that are missing from the LFATI and that are necessary for fully effective implementation of 
the law. These include:  
 We recommend introduction of a short timeframe for initial review of the request: if the 
authority determines that the holder of the information requested is another public 
body, it should be obliged to transfer the request to that body within 3 calendar days 
and should inform the requestor that this has been done.  
 If there is no response to a request within 8 calendar days from the date when it was 
filed (or an additional 15 days in the case of an extension having been notified), then 
the requestor may appeal this immediately.  
 The law should establish if administrative silence is positive or negative.   
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1.6.  Fees 
 
It is positive that the law prohibits a fee for filing requests (Article 11, paragraph 3) and that only 
the costs of reproducing the information (copying, transcribing) may be charged (Article 19 
paragraph 2).  
 
However we understand that no regulation has been introduced to establish the costs to be 
charged in spite of the fact that Article 19 refers specifically to a separate regulation. This is 
causing problems in practice because different institutions are establishing different costs, 
including those that are not real costs: for example, there are instances when they charge 
copying of one page € 0.50, although real costs would be maximum € 0.01 (the street cost of 
copying is around 10 eurocentimes; given that street photocopiers are a commercial enterprise, 
government costs should fall below this). .  
 
It is an unfortunate weakness of the drafting of the law that it does not make clear who is 
responsible to adopt such a regulation, nor that it should be unified for all institutions. We 
strongly recommend that such a harmonized resolution on minimum costs urgently be 
introduced, either by the Ministry of Finance or by the Ministry of Culture and Media, the 
institution is responsible for LFATI, as appropriate.   
 
In addition we recommend that the information that is subject to proactive disclosures under 
Article 5 (lists of types of information held, registers, procedures for access) as well as the new 
provisions on Proactive Publication of information (See Section 8) should introduce a class of 
information that is not subject to charges. This is to ensure that the basic information that has 
already been created with the tax-payers money (for example, annual report and accounts of 
government bodies, information about their core functions, etc) is available to all members of the 
public without the need for any extra payments (which almost amounts to a double taxation).  
 
We also recommend that consideration be given to the introduction of a fee waiver for  
i. small numbers of copies where the monies collected by the state are less than the costs of 
processing the payment. In some countries the first, 20 or 50 pages are free of charge by 
law, and in practice often documents of up to 200 pages are handed out free of charge.  
ii. for indigent requestors (there needs to be an exploration of how this would be 
demonstrated, such as if a person is already receiving welfare payments from the state). 
Criteria might include, for example, those whose income (salary or other income such as 
pension) has been established as being lower than the official extreme poverty line of 
€117 per person per month, the unemployed, and those receiving social welfare. 
 
The Information Commissioner should review the fees charged by each body for photocopying 
and materials, and make recommendations and in some cases recommend sanctions if the 
charges are being used in any way as an obstacle to the right to information.  
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Recommendations 
 
 Introduce a regulation that sets maximum charges for photocopying and costs of other 
materials, making clear that on-site inspection and electronic delivery of information should 
always be free of charge;  
 Introduce a fee waiver for small numbers of copies and for indigent requestors;  
 Amend the law to ensure that all information that should be published proactively is 
available free of charge;  
 Empower the Information Commissioner to inspect costs charged and to make 
recommendations as well as to sanction bodies found to be violating the costs provisions. 
 
 
1.7.  Exemptions: Information that may not be refused  
 
A separate analysis examines in detail the exemptions provisions of the LFATI and their relation 
to other legislation. At this point we note that it is positive that the law contains harm and public 
interest tests.  
 
We also note that it is particularly positive that Article 10 establishes that certain information may 
not under any circumstances be exempted from release to the public. There is a focus here on 
the classes of information that could expose abuse of power or corruption, including evidence of 
“disrespect to substantive regulations; unauthorized use of public resources; misuse of powers; 
unscrupulous performance of public duties; the existence of reasonable suspicions a criminal 
offence was committed; or the existence of the grounds for attacking a court judgment”. Such 
information must be released under all circumstances, “regardless of the seriousness of damages 
caused  to the interests referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 9 of this Law [on exemptions and 
protected interests] “ 
 
Whilst it may take some time for this provision to show its full value, we believe that it is a key 
element of the law and over time will underpin the value of the right to information in fighting 
corruption in Montenegro. 
 
There are however other classes of information that could usefully be mentioned in Article 10 as 
being exempt from any restrictions on disclosure. Typically, these provisions refer to information 
that would expose violations of human rights (past, current or future violations), threats to public 
health and safety, and damage to the environment. 
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1.8. Proactive Release of Information  
 
The Montenegrin law contains almost no requirements on what is known as proactive or ex 
officio publication of information, information that must be released without the need for a 
request. Under the LFATI, the only information that must be made public, as established by 
Article 5 of the law, is an obligation to compose and publish:  
 a list of the types of the information filed with the body (including also public registers 
and records) 
 data on the procedure for access to the information 
 names of the persons authorized to act upon any request for access to the information 
 other data of importance for exercising the right of access to the information (Guide for 
Access to Information).  
 
Although this basic requirement is positive, it is out of step with comparative standards: most 
modern access to information laws contain a more extensive list of information that should be 
made available proactively.  
 
In the pre-Internet age, the requirements in access to information usually required paper 
publication of core information related to the functioning of the public body. With most European 
public bodies now having extensive websites the requirements for proactive provision of 
information have expanded and in a number of countries new legislative provisions, known as e-
FOIA laws (electronic freedom of information) have been adopted. At a minimum, such 
provisions require publication of large volumes of “routine” information that relates to the core 
functions of each obliged body.  
 
Such comparative developments lead to the Council of Europe Recommendation 2002(2) 
including a number of relevant principles, including that  
• Member States should take the necessary measures to “inform the public about its rights 
of access to official documents and how that right may be exercised” (Principle X on 
“Complementary measures” at 1.i) 
• Member States should also “as far as possible, make available information on the 
matters or activities for which they are responsible, for example by drawing up lists or 
registers of the documents they hold” (Principle X, 2.iii).  
 
In addition, a specific provision, Principle X, dedicated to “Information made public at the 
initiative of the public authorities”, states that  
 
 A public authority should, at its own initiative and where appropriate, take the necessary 
measures to make public information which it holds when the provision of such 
information is in the interest of promoting the transparency of public administration and 
efficiency within administrations or will encourage informed participation by the public in 
matters of public interest. 
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Typically, there are a number of categories of information that should be made available. 
 
 (i) Information needed for exercise of the right of access to information: such 
information would include indexes or register of information held. It would also include the name 
and contact information of the Information Officer and details on mechanisms for requesting 
information. This requirement is already included in the LFATI.  
 
(ii) Financial, Structural and Administrative Information: this includes information on the 
budget and structure of the institution, which should include:  
• Organizational structure: The organizational structure of the public body indicating 
all its organizational units, including departments and agencies under direction of the 
institution, with the tasks of the individual organizational units. This information should 
include the name, rank and contact information (phone and fax number, e-mail address) 
of the managers of the public body and the managers of the individual organizational 
units, agencies, etc. 
• Budget Reports: the public body’s annual report and accounts as well as projected 
budget for the current year, and all reports on actual income and on the expenditure of 
the budget for current year to date, including budgetary and extra-budgetary incomes 
and expenditures. 
• Employee Financial Information: summary information concerning the number of 
employees and their remuneration (by position and/or by name according to domestic 
law, but preferably by name), as well as a summary of the type and amount of benefits 
granted to employees. For managers and senior officials, information on wages, fringe 
benefits, regular benefits and expenses reimbursement. 
 
(iii) Administrative, Decision-Making, Information needed for Participation 
Traditionally information that relates to the core functioning of a public body has been available. 
Information has often been available after decisions have been taken. In modern democracies it 
is expected that information will also be made available in advance of decisions being taken in 
order to permit public comment and contributions. Information on policies under consideration, 
draft regulations, planned budget expenditures, should all be made available.  
 
 (iv) Information needed for ensuring probity (anti-corruption information) 
Another class of information that it is increasingly common for laws require to be made public is 
information needed to ensure financial probity. It is widely accepted that transparency of 
financial information reduces the potential space for corruption. Such information would typically 
include:  
• Assets Declaration:  assets declaration of, at least, the head and senior officials of the 
body. All appointed and public officials with responsibility in areas where there is a high risk 
of corruption should be required to submit assets declarations.  
• Declarations of Interests: the declarations of external interests of senior public officials, 
particularly where there may be a conflict of interest such as their membership on the board 
of a company that receives public procurement contracts.  
• Gifts declarations:  declarations of gifts received by senior public officials, with information 
on the source and value of the gift (in some countries gifts over a certain value must be 
handed over to the public body rather than retained by the minister or other official). 
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(v) Information on the Public Procurement Process 
The public body should publish key information related to the public procurement process. This 
information should include:  
• List of contracts: the public body should publish a full list of all contracts concluded with 
external suppliers of goods, services, etc., including the name of the contractors and the 
value of the contract and summary of nature of goods/services to be provided. 
• List of concessions/licenses: List of all concessions/licences granted by the Public 
Institution, together with the value, and summary of the nature and duration of the 
concession/licence. 
• Details on public procurement / tender processes including details of upcoming 
tenders, public bidding guidelines or terms, financial and technical specifications, selection 
criteria and the weighting given to these criteria. Details should be made available on all 
those who competed, with fuller details on the winner of the tender, as well as the contract 
itself being made available. Whilst there will be some commercial secrets exemptions applied 
here, comparative jurisprudence makes clear that the majority of contract information must 
be made public. 
• Evaluation of compliance with contract conditions, as well as any sanctions imposed 
by the public body for non-compliance with the contract or for failure to meet deadlines.  
 
 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
 The LFATI should be amended to include provisions requiring proactive release of 
information.  
 The LFATI should be amended to require that all proactive information should be provided 
free of charge. 
 
 
 
1.9.  Environmental Information  
 
Montenegro’s constitution at Article 1 establishes, inter alia, that Montenegro is a “ecological 
state”. The importance of access to environmental information is such that there is an 
international treaty dedicated to this, the UN/ECE Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, known as the 
Aarhus Convention. Montenegro has not yet signed the Aarhus Convention.  
 
The European Union’s Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 
January 2003 on public access to environmental information, incorporate the principles of the 
Aarhus Convention. We note that the European Union signed the Aarhus Convention on 25 June 
1998 as a result of which, provisions of Community law must be consistent with that Convention, 
so for future EU membership, Montenegro will need to harmonize its law with these provisions.  
 
 
 
 
 18 
In the meantime, Montenegro can prepare for the ratification of Aarhus and compliance with EU 
standards by ensuring that its own legislation contains requirements on disclosure of 
environmental information (and on concomitant public participation). Such provisions should 
refer to private bodies as well to the extent required by Aarhus. The relevant Aarhus provisions 
state that :  
 
3. “Environmental information” means any information in written, visual, aural, electronic or 
any other material form on: 
(a) The state of elements of the environment, such as air and atmosphere, water, soil, land, 
landscape and natural sites, biological diversity and its components, including genetically 
modified organisms, and the interaction among these elements; 
(b) Factors, such as substances, energy, noise and radiation, and activities or measures, 
including administrative measures, environmental agreements, policies, legislation, plans and 
programmes, affecting or likely to affect the elements of the environment within the scope of 
subparagraph (a) above, and cost-benefit and other economic analyses and assumptions 
used in environmental decision-making; 
(c) The state of human health and safety, conditions of human life, cultural sites and built 
structures, inasmuch as they are or may be affected by the state of the elements of the 
environment or, through these elements, by the factors, activities or measures referred to in 
subparagraph (b) above. 
 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
 Montenegro’s law should ensure full access to environmental information in line with the 
Aarhus Convention and European law. This is particularly appropriate for a constitutionally 
ecologic state. 
 
 
 
1.10.  Relation with the Archives Law 
 
There is a need to clarify whether or not the Free Access to Information Law will applies to all 
information held in the historical archives in Montenegro. We strongly recommend that the right 
to information does apply to all information held by all parts of government, with necessary 
exemptions for access to historic documents that are in a delicate physical condition. The right of 
access as established by international law applies not only to current documents but to all 
documents held by public bodies, irrespective of their date of creation.  
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1.11.  Whistleblower Protection 
 
The LFATI contains a form of “whistleblower” provision in Article 25 of the law which establishes 
that any official who, acting in good faith in accordance with his/her duties, releases information 
that reveals misconduct or abuse of power by any other official, may not be penalized for such 
disclosure, provided that they inform the head of the authority or the relevant investigative 
authority.  
 
The provision says that any employee who discloses such information may not be held 
accountable. It is presumed that the information is not released following an information request, 
although this should be clarified.  
 
However, the location of this provision in the access to information law seems to imply that it 
might also refer to officials who release information to the public following an information 
request. In that case the official is only exempt if they also inform their superior or an 
investigative agency. This could be complex in practice. For example, imagine a case in which an 
official is asked to release information including budget expenditure details, copies of public 
works contracts and other information held by a particular public body. Imagine then that when 
this information is examined by the requestor (an investigative journalist or NGO for example), it 
shows that there has been some wrongdoing. But the public official who passed on the 
information, was not aware of this as she/he had not compiled the different documents and 
analysed them, but merely provided a collection of documents in response to the request. In that 
case, the official would not have informed his or her boss or other body, and this provision would 
not apply to them.  
 
 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
 It is positive that the Montenegrin law contains a whistleblower protection. It could be 
further clarified to ensure that it provides full protection to public officials who release 
information under the law.  
 In parallel, a full whistleblower law that also protects those working in private companies 
who leak information of public interest, such as information revealing abuse or wrongdoing, 
should be adopted in Montenegro. The whistleblower law should include mechanisms for 
internal disclosure of information and for bodies to which whistleblowers can turn for 
support and protection.  
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1.12.  Sanctions  
 
The law establishes a number of penal provisions in the form of fines that may be imposed for 
violations of the law. The public agency and the responsible person may be fined.  
 
The violations identified include failing publish the Guide for Access to Information that each 
body is obliged to produce (Article5); failing to enable inspection of public registers and records 
(Article6); failing to provide information in the form required by disabled persons (Article 7); and 
failing to provide access to the applicant (Article 8, which says that access must be provided 
barring legitimate exceptions established by the law).  
 
There are also fines for violations of Article 9 (application exemptions) and Article 10 
(requirement that all information exposing wrongdoing be published), as well as of Article 25 (the 
provision that says that no one may be penalized for exposing misconduct by another official).  
 
What is not clear is who would initiate the process for some of these sanctions. For example, a 
number of bodies have failed to publish their Guides for Access to Information but so far there 
has been no sanction. And whilst there has been litigation to challenge failures to respond to 
information requests or misapplication of exemptions, this has tended to result in orders to 
release the information or review the administrative decision rather than a fine on the public 
body.  
 
We also note that there is no distinction between lesser and more serious offences. For example, 
failing to publish the Guide for Access to Information is perhaps a lesser offence than repeated 
obstruction of requests or taking action against an official who has exposed corruption. Other 
offences that other access to information laws establish and that are particularly grave, such as 
willful destruction of documents, are not covered by this law and should be introduced.  
 
Our main recommendation is that it should be the Information Commission, whose establishment 
is proposed in Section 14 below that should recommend the imposition of these sanctions. This 
Commission can then take appropriate action. For example, small government bodies may not 
have published the Guide for Access to Information because they have limited human resources 
and are not experts in the theme. In this case, it would be better if they were provided with 
assistance from the Information Commission rather than being fined.  
 
We note that the object of the lighter sanctions should be to encourage the release of 
information and not to create any fear amongst public officials that they will be penalized if they 
release information. As such, they should be imposed with care and  particularly for repeated 
violations of the law.  
 
 
Recommendations 
 
• Revise sanctions to make sure all possible offences that violate right to information are 
covered and that there is a range of sanctions depending on the gravity of the offence;  
• More serious offences such as willful destruction of documents should be dealt with by this 
law and should also be established as criminal offences.  
 Empower the future Information Commissioner to act ex officio on breaches of the law and 
to recommend sanctions. 
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1.13.  Personal Data Protection.  
 
The law makes references to protection of personal data insofar as this is one of the exceptions 
to the right to information. Specifically Article 9.3 provides that information should not be 
released if it would cause significant harm to:  
 
privacy and other personal rights of individuals, except for the purposes of court or 
administrative procedures, through disclosing the information: 
a. concerning private lives of parties and witnesses in the procedures, as well as of 
victims and parties injured by criminal offences, and through disclosing the 
information of adjudicated persons; 
b. contained in personal and medical files of individuals, findings obtained from 
psychiatric and psychology examinations and personal disposition tests; 
c. relating to the establishment of parental rights, adoption of children and alike; 
d. regarding individual employment, income, pension, relief and other social welfare 
benefits; 
e. giving phone numbers, temporary or permanent residences of individuals and their 
families, if such individuals require a relevant authority to keep the information secret 
because they reasonably believe their and their families’ safety is at risk; 
 
Whilst it is positive that the LFATI recognizes the right to privacy and elaborates on what this 
right means, such a provision does not substitute for a full data protection law:  Montenegro 
needs a full data protection law that meets European standards on the right to data protection. 
This will become an absolute requirement in any future candidacy for EU membership.  
 
The main elements of such a law include that all personal data held by any public or private body 
be subject to rules about how it is processed, stored, used, shared and transferred 
internationally. Individual members of the public should have a right to know what data is held 
about them and to receive a copy of that data. They should also have a right to challenge the 
accuracy of the data, and to have changes made or their comments appended to the data. Such 
a right clearly entails additional legal mechanisms that cannot be contained in an access to 
information law.  
 
In addition, the fact that a data protection law obliges private bodies as well as public bodies 
clearly requires that an additional piece of legislation is adopted.  
 
Data protection law is a complex body of law that is under constant evolution at the European 
and global level. The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
recognizes the right at Article 8 on Right to respect for private and family life:  
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others. 
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Numerous cases of the European Court of Human Rights have interpreted the scope of this right.  
 
Within the EU, the necessities of the internal market and the trans-frontier nature of information 
flows have resulted in data protection law being harmonized across all EU member states in line 
with EU directives (the first is Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data) and jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice 
(for more information see: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/law/index_en.htm).  
 
There is an EU requirement that a each country has a national Data Protection Commissioner to 
oversee data protection law and hear complains. In many countries such oversight is combined 
with oversight of the right to information in a single Information Commissioner operating with 
separate departments specialised in each issue. We recommend this as an appropriate solution 
for Montenegro. A good model to study would be the Slovenian Information Commissioner 
which, since January 2006, has combined the access to information and the data protection 
functions.  
 
 
Recommendations 
 
• Montenegro should introduce a personal data protection law.  
• The government should work with civil society to develop this law.  
• It would be appropriate if the Information Commissioner were also responsible for 
oversight of the data protection law.  
 
 
 
1.14.  Information Commission or Information Commissioner 
 
An increasing number of countries worldwide have an Information Commission or Commissioner 
to oversee the access to information law. Examples in Europe include Commissioners in the UK, 
Ireland, Germany, and Hungary and Commissioners in France and Portugal. Globally too, Canada 
and Australia have commissioners at national and regional levels and Mexico has Commissions at 
Federal and state level. In the former Yugoslavia, Serbia and Slovenia have Commissioners, 
Macedonia has a Commission and Bosnia has the Deputy Ombudsperson responsible for this 
issue. The great advantage of these institutions is that help the administration with the 
implementation of the law and provide a fast and low-cost forum for deciding on disputes over 
information requests. We note that countries that have an Information Commissioner generally 
have a much more successful implementation of the Access to Information law. This is a more 
effective mechanism than the Ombudsman because the Ombudsman has many other duties and 
cannot dedicate sufficient resources to the right to information.  
 
It is strongly recommended that Montenegro follows this trend and institute a body that will 
oversee the implementation of the law. There is little difference between a Commissioner and 
Commission in terms of their powers. A Commission has the advantage of having more members 
who can specialize in different areas (access to information, data protection, information 
management, e-governance) and support each other in decision-making. It also creates the 
possibility of electing a rotating membership that is less susceptible to political pressures.  
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Whether there is one Commission or more than one Commissioner, the responsible persons 
should be selected by an open process in which there are nominations from different sectors of 
society including civil society and open hearings before the person is appointed. The candidates 
for Commissioner(s) should be persons who have a track record in related professions and not 
have a political background. For example, in the UK the Commissioner is a lawyer with 
experience in consumer rights, his two deputies have worked in local government and trades 
unions respectively. The Hungarian Commissioner was a lawyer and political scientist who 
worked to promote the right to information as far back as the 1980s, the Irish Commissioner was 
a political correspondent; the Slovenian Commissioner has a law and communications 
background.  
 
The role of a Commissioner is not to defend the requestors nor the government but to defend 
the right to information. This means defending the principle of open government and also 
protecting the legitimate interests such as national security, commercial secrets and protection of 
personal data. The Commissioner’s job will be to make sure that the right to information 
functions smoothly in practice and that any limitations are appropriately applied and subject to 
the public interest test. The benefit of a Commissioner is that it builds up experience over time 
and can provide a specialized understanding of the issues whether the task it to recommend an 
information management system or adjudicate over a disputed information request.  
 
The mandate of the Commissioner should be to promote and protect the right to information, 
rule on appeals against refusals to provide information and promote the right to privacy and 
protection of data held by public and private bodies. The Commissioner should have the following 
powers and duties which are drawn from a comparative analysis of Commissioner’s offices 
worldwide:  
 
• Operational independence: designs its own internal regulation; defines its budget and staff 
structures;  
• Reports annually to parliament on the implementation of the law, including with statistics 
gathered from every public body and other research that it carries out; 
• Promotes public awareness of the right to information through creation and dissemination of 
guides on how to file requests, publicity materials and by engaging in public debate about 
the right to information; 
• Trains and assists public officials in how to implement the law and is ready to respond with 
guidance on specific requests; 
• Produces guidance on particular aspects of the law and on how to apply exemptions (see for 
example the excellent guides produced by the UK Commissioner’s Office 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/tools_and_resources/document_library/freedom_of_information.aspx 
• Helps the administration with the design of systems for filing requests electronically (possibly 
through a unified electronic requesting system as in Mexico) 
• Monitors compliance by public authorities with provisions of the law that require proactive 
publication of information and development of citizen guides; 
• Promotes the appropriate classification of information (as will be regulated by the future 
state secrets law in Montenegro, as well as under laws regulating commercials secrets) 
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including through having the power to review classified documents both ex officio and when 
there is a disputed information request; 
• Receives and reviews complaints from requestors about refusals, partial answers, incomplete 
answers, administrative silence (failure to answer requests at all) and other alleged breaches 
of the right to information. The Commissioner becomes the first instance body for hearing 
and ruling on complaints in the way that in Montenegro is currently handled by the courts. 
The Commissioner decides on a case by confirming or overturning administrative decisions, 
and where appropriate by ordering release of the information;  
• Recommends sanctions against public bodies that have violated the law;  
• Participates in court processes related to the right to information and data protection either 
as an expert witness or by submitting amicus curiae briefs as appropriate; 
• Proposes to parliament legislative reforms necessary for ensuring better respect for the right 
to information and right to personal data protection;  
• Represents Montenegro in international forums where issues of the right to information and 
data protection are being debated;  
• Liaises with all members of society including the administration and civil society 
organizations on how to ensure the right to information is fully respected in Montenegro.  
 
For reference the following websites provide further insight into the functioning of selected 
Commissions and Commissioners (all have sites in English and/or southern Slavic language): 
  
United Kingdom Information Commissioner’s Office                                http://www.ico.gov.uk/ 
Scotland Information Commissioner   http://www.itspublicknowledge.info/ 
Slovenian Information Commissioner             http://www.ip-rs.si/index.php?id=126 
Ireland’s Information Commissioner                   http://www.oic.gov.ie/en/ 
Berlin Information Commissioner     http://www.datenschutz-berlin.de/ueber/aktuelle/inheng.htm 
Serbian Information Commissioner                                   www.poverenik.org.yu 
French CADA                                                     www.cada.fr 
Mexican Information Commission                                  http://www.ifai.org.mx/ 
Macedonian Information Commission                                http://www.sinf.gov.mk/ 
 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
• Montenegro should introduce an amendment to its Law on Free Access to Information that 
will result in the establishment of an Information Commission or Information Commissioner. 
This should be treated as an urgent priority for ensuring full implementation of the LFATI.  
• The government should work with civil society to develop this law and should take into 
consideration the experience of other European countries that have such a law, including 
the countries in the South East Europe region.  
• It would be appropriate if the Information Commissioner were also responsible for 
oversight of the data protection law.  
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Introduction  
 
The purpose of this analysis and recommendations is to propose ways in which Montenegro’s 
Law on Free Access to Information (LFATI) and related legislation should be interpreted and 
amended in order to ensure full compliance with the right of access to information.  
 
Montenegro has a full access to information law adopted in November 2005 which contains a list 
of exemptions to the public release of information. Montenegro since its independence has not 
adopted a new law on state secrets nor has it harmonised laws on commercial secrets with 
modern European standards.  
 
In this analysis we first present the standards that Montenegro is obliged to uphold when 
establishing any secrecy legislation, we then analyse the exemptions provisions of the existing 
LFATI in the context of these standards, and finally consider the main elements of other 
legislation that should also be introduced/amended, notably the state secrets law.  
 
In conducting this analysis, we have been guided by established international standards, 
including the provisions of the ICCPR and ECHR, and the Recommendation 2002(2) of the 
Council of Europe on Access to Official Documents. We have also drawn on comparative law and 
jurisprudence, particularly that from the member countries of the European Union.  
 
2.1. Exemptions to the right of access to information permitted by international law 
 
The right to information is a fundamental but not an absolute right. This is clearly established by 
the provisions of international law that provide for a right of access to information. For example, 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms provides the 
right to “to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers.” 
 
The permissible restrictions are set out in Article 10(2) which sets forth that “[t]he exercise of these 
freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, 
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or 
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”  
 
In practice the European states that have adopted freedom of information laws have defined a 
slightly different list of exemptions which function more logically in practice when it comes to the 
exercise of the right to information. This list is encapsulated in the Council of Europe 
Recommendation 2002(2), adopted by the Committee of Ministers in 2002 and currently being 
converted into a binding treaty which all Member States of the Council of Europe (including 
Montenegro in due course) will be expected to sign and ratify. This treaty will be important in 
that it will establish a limited regime for exemptions to the right of access to information and will 
not permit any other legislation that establishes a broader secrecy regime. In other words, 
Council of Europe member states will have to harmonize their legislation with this set of 
exemptions.  
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Council of Europe Recommendation 2002(2) at Principle IV sets out the permissible 
exemptions:  
 
IV.  Possible limitations to access to official documents*  
 
1. Member states may limit the right of access to official documents. Limitations should be set 
down precisely in law, be necessary in a democratic society and be proportionate to the aim of 
protecting: 
i.  national security, defence and international relations; 
ii.             public safety; 
iii. the prevention, investigation and prosecution of criminal activities;  
iv. privacy and other legitimate private interests; 
v.             commercial and other economic interests, be they private or public;  
vi. the equality of parties concerning court proceedings; 
vii. [nature];  
viii. inspection, control and supervision by public authorities; 
ix. the economic, monetary and exchange rate policies of the state; 
 x.  the confidentiality of deliberations within or between public authorities during  
                           the internal preparation of a matter. 
 
2. Access to a document may be refused if the disclosure of the information contained in the 
official document would or would be likely to harm any of the interests mentioned in paragraph 
1, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure. 
 
3. Member states should consider setting time limits beyond which the limitations mentioned in 
paragraph 1 would no longer apply. 
 
* NB: as noted elsewhere in this document, this list is currently under revision and 
Montenegro’s legislators would be advised to verify the actual text of the future treaty which is  
currently being drafted by the Council of Europe.  
 
 
Although likely to be subject to some modification during the treaty drafting process, the essence 
of these exemptions is likely to remain. In Section N** below we analyse the current 
Montenegrin Law against these exemptions.  
 
The countries of the Council of Europe region are all in the process of reforming their secrecy 
laws to ensure better harmonization with the right of access to information; this is not a 
challenge for Montenegro alone. As a recent report from the OSCE Rapporteur on Freedom of 
the Media notes:  
 
 Modern FOI principles constitute a Copernican revolution for the development of the free 
press. By passing them either as Constitutional amendments or basic laws, the states give up 
their absolute right to withhold information, and introduce the primacy of their citizens’ right 
to know about the government, making it an exception defined in law when the government 
still has the right to classify information.1 
                                                 
1 “Access to information by the media in the OSCE region: trends and recommendations” Vienna, 30 
April 2007, at page 1 
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The reality is, however, as the OSCE Rapportuer concludes, that this “Copernican revolution” –
this paradigm shift – is not yet complete: “Unfortunately, many countries … have not yet 
adjusted their rules of classification to the FOI principles, that is, they disregard the primacy of 
the public’s right to know.”2 
 
In order to overcome this situation, the OSCE makes a series of recommendations that are 
directly relevant for Montenegro given that it is in the process of reforming its legislation at this 
point in time. First are the principles that should be included in any access to information law:  
 
An Access to Information Regime Should Ensure that …  
• Some information of a sensitive nature may be subject to withholding for a limited, specified 
time for the period it is sensitive.  
• The exemptions should be limited in scope.  
• The official who wishes to withhold the information must identify the harm that would occur 
for each case of withholding.  
• The public interest in disclosure should be considered in each case.  
• In cases where information may be deemed sensitive by any other law, the FOI law must 
have precedence. 
 
This principle is followed be a series of recommendations for any state secrets and related 
legislation, which Montenegro should incorporate into it’s future laws:  
 
OSCE Recommendations on classification rules 
• The definition of state secrets should be limited only to data that directly relate to the 
national security of the state and where their unauthorized release would have identifiable 
and serious consequences. Information designated as “Official” or “work secrets” should not 
be considered for classification as state secrets. Limits on their disclosure should be found in 
the access to information law. 
• Information relating to violations of the law or human rights, maladministration or 
administrative errors, threats to public health or the environment, the health of senior 
elected officials, statistical, social-economic or cultural information, basic scientific 
information, or that which is merely embarrassing to individuals or organisations should not 
be classified as a state or official secret.  
• Information should only be classified as a state secret for a limited period of time where the 
release of the information would cause a serious harm to the interests of the nation. 
• Information that is classified should be regularly reviewed and have a date after which it will 
be declassified and released. It should be presumed that no information should be classified 
for more than 15 years unless compelling reasons can be show for withholding it.  
• Governments should institute a review of all secret information over 15 years old and 
automatically declassify and release it. All information that was designated as secret by a 
previous non-democratic government should be declassified and presumptively released 
                                                 
2 “Access to information by the media in the OSCE region: trends and recommendations” Vienna, 30 
April 2007, see page 4 
 
 29 
unless it is shown that its release would endanger the national security or be an unwarranted 
invasion of privacy.  
• An independent body that is not part of the intelligence, military or security services should 
have oversight over classified information and ensure that the system is operating properly, 
receive complaints about improperly classified information and review and order the 
declassification of information. 
 
The OSCE report is important as it is a synthesis of the current standards in Europe and directly 
applicable to Montenegro.  
 
Another source of secrecy regulation in Europe are the requirements for classification of 
documents shared between NATO states. Although only directly relevant for NATO members and 
members of the Partnership for Peace, these standards are nevertheless useful to take into 
consideration when drafting the future secrecy laws in Montenegro. NATO standards establish 
four levels of classification for information Top Secret, Secret, Confidential and Restricted. There 
is actually a 5th category, which is “Unclassified”. As NATO notes in its 2002 document on 
Security of Information: 
  “the classification assigned determines the physical security given to the information in 
storage and transmission, its circulation, destruction and the personnel security 
clearance required for access. Therefore both over-classification and under-classification 
should be avoided in the interests of effective security as well as efficiency.” 3 
 
NATO recommends that all classification be reviewed at least every five years unless the 
originally classification allocated to the document was predetermined to be automatically 
downgraded after two years4. It is important to note that such time frames in a security-sensitive 
organization like NATO contrast with the tendency for longer classification periods in many 
countries around the world. This indicates that where there is a need to balance real security 
with the efficiency of a security operation then in most cases information will only have any 
potential to cause real harm for a very limited period of time.  
 
As noted above, however, the OSCE recommends that an access to information law should 
always take precedence over a state secrets law, and hence the time period for classification is in 
some ways less important than the fact that when a request for information is received, the 
relevant official reviews the information to determine whether it would indeed cause harm to a 
protected interest by being released.  
 
Finally another source of standards on the classification of information on grounds of national 
security are the Johannesburg Principles5. Adopted in 1996 by a experts in international human 
rights law, the Principles were subsequently endorsed by Mr. Abid Hussain, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, in his reports to the 1996, 1998,1999 and 
                                                 
3 NATO, Enclosure “E” to C-M(2002)49 at paragraph 4.  
4 NATO, Enclosure “E” to C-M(2002)49 at paragraph 6. 
5 The Johannesburg Principles were adopted on 1 October 1995 following consultations with and a 
meeting of 35 experts in international law, national security and human rights convened by the 
organization Article 19 (London). See http://www.article19.org/pdfs/standards/joburgprinciples.pdf.  
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2001 sessions of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and referred to by the 
Commission in their annual resolutions on freedom of expression every year since 1996. 
 
The basis for the Johannesburg Principles is the same as that found in other areas of  
international law: namely that any “no restrictions on freedom of expression and [access to] 
information on the ground of national security may be imposed unless the government can 
demonstrate that the restriction is prescribed by law and is necessary in a democratic society to 
protect a legitimate national security interest. The burden of demonstrating the validity of the 
restriction rests with the government.” 
 
Johannesburg Principles On National Security6  
 
Section III.  Restrictions On Freedom Of Information 
 
Principle 11: General Rule on Access to Information 
Everyone has the right to obtain information from public authorities, including information 
relating to national security. No restriction on this right may be imposed on the ground of 
national security unless the government can demonstrate that the restriction is prescribed by 
law and is necessary in a democratic society to protect a legitimate national security interest. 
 
Principle 12: Narrow Designation of Security Exemption 
A state may not categorically deny access to all information related to national security, but 
must designate in law only those specific and narrow categories of information that it is 
necessary to withhold in order to protect a legitimate national security interest. 
 
Principle 13: Public Interest in Disclosure 
In all laws and decisions concerning the right to obtain information, the public interest in 
knowing the information shall be a primary consideration. 
 
Principle 14: Right to Independent Review of Denial of Information 
The state is obliged to adopt appropriate measures to give effect to the right to obtain 
information. These measures shall require the authorities, if they deny a request for 
information, to specify their reasons for doing so in writing and as soon as reasonably 
possible; and shall provide for a right of review of the merits and the validity of the denial by 
an independent authority, including some form of judicial review of the legality of the denial. 
The reviewing authority must have the right to examine the information withheld. 
 
Principle 15: General Rule on Disclosure of Secret Information 
No person may be punished on national security grounds for disclosure of information if (1) 
the disclosure does not actually harm and is not likely to harm a legitimate national security 
interest, or (2) the public interest in knowing the information outweighs the harm from 
disclosure. 
 
Principle 16: Information Obtained Through Public Service 
No person may be subjected to any detriment on national security grounds for disclosing 
information that he or she learned by virtue of government service if the public interest in 
knowing the information outweighs the harm from disclosure.  
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2.2.  Exemptions Provisions of the Montenegrin FOI Law  
 
In this section we examine the exemptions provisions of Montenegro’s LFATI in the light of the 
standards set out above.  
 
The exemptions in the LFATI are set out in Article 9, with related provisions being contained in 
Articles 10, 13 and 14. One of the biggest problems with Article 9 is that it confuses two 
concepts. One is that it establishes the legitimate interests that may used as a justification for 
not releasing information if such information would harm (“significantly endanger) these interests 
– interests such as national security, international relations, public safety, and commercial 
interests. The second is that it lists the sources or types of information that are deemed to pose 
harm to such interests.  
 
For example, at Article 9 paragraph 1, reads as follows, stating that information may not be 
released if it would significantly endanger:  
 
national security and defence or international relations, primarily through disclosing the 
information: 
a. from security intelligence agencies and intelligence agencies for national security; 
b. from military intelligence services; 
c. of armed forces activities;  
d. about buildings, installations and systems that are intended exclusively for the State 
defense purposes; 
e. of importance for international tribunals or investigation bodies or other international 
authorities or organizations’ work; 
 
Principle 17: Information in the Public Domain 
Once information has been made generally available, by whatever means, whether or not 
lawful, any justification for trying to stop further publication will be overridden by the public's 
right to know. 
 
Principle 18: Protection of Journalists' Sources 
Protection of national security may not be used as a reason to compel a journalist to reveal a 
confidential source. 
 
Principle 19: Access to Restricted Areas 
Any restriction on the free flow of information may not be of such a nature as to thwart the 
purposes of human rights and humanitarian law. In particular, governments may not prevent 
journalists or representatives of intergovernmental or nongovernmental organizations with a 
mandate to monitor adherence to human rights or humanitarian standards from entering areas 
where there are reasonable grounds to believe that violations of human rights or humanitarian 
law are being, or have been, committed. Governments may not exclude journalists or 
representatives of such organizations from areas that are experiencing violence or armed 
conflict except where their presence would pose a clear risk to the safety of others. 
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Whilst the protection of national security, defence and international relations are acceptable 
limitations on the right of access to information in some circumstances, it is completely 
unacceptable to stipulate that all information whose provenance is the secret intelligence services 
would necessarily harm one of these interests (eg: would harm national security). Indeed, as a 
court case in Montenegro has already established, information relating to the budget and some 
operational activities of the intelligence agencies (the number of people under surveillance in a 
year) can be released on legitimate grounds of public interest without any harm to state security.  
 
In this respect at least, the limitation under Article 1 benefits from the qualification in the final 
paragraph of Article 9 which states that:  
 The interests referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be considered significantly 
endangered if disclosing such information would cause them damages considerably 
bigger than the public interest in publishing such information is. 
 
Unfortunately, however, the qualification established by this paragraph does not apply to the 
other 6 paragraphs of Article 9, which it should (with the possible exemption of paragraph (6) on  
privacy, although even this may be subject to some limited public interest test, such as when the 
individual in question is a public figure, when another vital interest is at stake or when the 
information for other reasons is already accessible in the public domain). 
 
The need to apply the public interest test to other sections of Article 9 can be demonstrated by 
examination of some of the other paragraphs. For example, paragraph 4.b appears to require 
that no information held by the government should be disclosed if it relates “to the capital and 
financial markets” out of an interest in protecting the “economic, monetary and foreign exchange 
policy of the State”. Clearly there is much information that is held by the government that relates 
to the capital and financial markets that would in no way damage the economic, monetary and 
foreign exchange policy of the State. In this sense sub-paragraph (b) of Article 9 paragraph 4 is 
completely superfluous. All that is needed here is to state that information that would cause 
significant harm to the protected interest (the economic, monetary and foreign exchange policy 
of the State) may be restricted unless there is an overriding public interest in its release. Both 
the potential damage and the countervailing public interest should be assessed on a case-by-
case basis upon receipt of an actual request for information.  
 
Similarly, while international law permits the restriction of information that would harm “public 
safety” it is ludicrous to assert that disclosure of information “relating to … the safety of 
individuals” would necessarily harm public safety (Article 9 paragraph 2.b). Indeed, in many 
cases, public safety is best protected by the rapid release and widespread dissemination of 
information related to public safety. For example, advising the public on how to protect 
themselves in the event of a natural disaster such as an earthquake or how to prevent the 
spread of an epidemic.  
 
It is evident that the drafters of the Montenegrin LFATI took the language of comparative 
international standards (such as the Council of Europe Recommendation 2002(2)) and then 
added a few examples to flesh out the text. This was an unnecessary strategy which 
unfortunately broadens the exemptions provisions of the law beyond the clearly defined limits of 
international standards and also creates provisions that will be much harder to interpret in 
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practice and which are more likely to lead public officials to refuse to disclose information that in 
fact is completely harmless and that belongs in the public domain.  
 
Of particular concern is the potentially broad interpretation of “business secrets” inserted at 
Article 9 paragraph 3.b. Whilst private companies do have legitimate business secrets, when they 
enter into business with the state, such as via a public procurement contract, they must accept 
that some commercially sensitive information will be released in the interest of guaranteeing 
transparency and protecting the procurement process from abuse, nepotism and corruption. It 
will become known, for example, not only the overall price of all bids but, for the winning tender 
at least, significantly more details about their pricing and operating structure, information that 
would not normally enter the public domain but which is vital to ensure  probity and effective use 
of the tax-payer’s money.  
 
A reworking of Article 9 taking these concerns into consideration might result in language more 
similar to the following:  
 
Article 9 
Access to information may only be restricted if its disclosure would cause serious and irreparable 
harm to one of the following protected interested and provided that there is no overriding public 
interest in the disclosure of the information:  
1) national security and defence or international relations 
2) public safety 
3) the legitimate competitive interests of a public or private entity, insofar as this is 
compatible with the need for public scrutiny of procurement processes;  
4) the economic monetary and foreign exchange policy of the State;  
5) the prevention, investigation and prosecution of criminal activities;   
6) the fair administration of justice;  
7) the ability of public authorities to verify compliance with legal requirements through 
inspections or controls, and to conduct tests or examinations;  
8) the confidentiality of deliberations within or between public authorities during the 
internal preparation of a matter;  
9) privacy and other personal rights of individuals.  
 
Information classified under other legislation: It is further unacceptable that Article 9 
contains general references to information classified or restricted under other legislation (Article 
9, paragraph 3.c refers to information “contained in a separate law on the confidentiality of 
data). As noted in the international standards section above (Section I), both the OSCE and 
Council of Europe recommendations require the access to information law takes precedence over 
any classification of data. In a number of European access to information regimes, information 
which has been classified will have that classification reviewed upon each and every request for 
information (in established regimes such as Sweden, for example, this is routinely done by civil 
servants; in Hungary the Information Commissioner can review classification of information). In 
no case must the access to information law defer automatically to other legislation: the reason 
for this is that an access to information is setting out the mechanism for exercise of a 
fundamental human right and any other legislation that restricts that right cannot automatically 
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take precedence without at least the right for review of the restriction by the administration and 
the right to appeal that restriction to an oversight body and eventually to a court of law.  
 
Documents under preparation/Internal Deliberations: Article 9 paragraph 7 confuses two 
aspects of international standards that permit some limited restriction on access to documents. 
The first is that documents that relate to, as the Council of Europe defines it “the confidentiality 
of deliberations within or between public authorities during the internal preparation of a matter” 
may be exempted from release while such deliberation is ongoing only. This exemption is 
designed to protect frank expression of opinion during policy debates within government. The 
second provision woven into Article 9 paragraph 7 is that documents under preparation (or as 
Article 9, paragraph 7.b puts is “information .. that are in the course of their processing, or the 
information that are not in any official document form, except for laws or other general 
documents”.  
 
There is a need to disentangle these two notions. With respect to the second concept, that of 
unfinished documents, while some countries (France, Sweden) register documents as “official” 
and do not consider documents that have not been registered as falling under the scope of their 
laws, the majority of countries include all information in whatever form as falling under the scope 
of the law. With the global move towards recognition of the right to information (rather than the 
earlier and narrower “access to documents” laws) most laws globally do not now exclude prima 
facie any documents or information at all. One survey found that in 18 of the countries surveyed, 
the definition of information includes documents under preparation in the sense of unfinished 
documents. Indeed, in a number of countries it is clearly established in law and practice that they 
fall under the broad definition of information that is subject to the law. In the UK, for example, 
the definition of information includes documents under preparation or draft documents7.  
 
On the other hand, it is quite acceptable to limit for a short period of time while policy-making is 
going on the exchange of information or opinions that are feeding into the policy development. 
Once, however, a decision has been made, all related information should be made public. Article 
9 paragraph 7 should be reformed to clarify this and to require that when information is related 
to negotiations or policy formation, it must be made public in due course. When requestors seek 
such information, they should be informed of when it will become available. In addition, in cases 
of all such requests, the need to protect policy-making or negotiations should include a public 
interest test so that in some case the information is made available. An example, would be in the 
case of an ongoing negotiation relating to privatization of a major state-owned enterprise where 
there is clearly a significant public interest in the privatization process being as transparent as 
possible.  
 
Who decides on application of exemptions? A number of access to information laws 
stipulate that while any officer may release information, restrictions may only be imposed 
following internal consultations (Mexico’s 2002 Federal Law on Transparency and Access to Public 
Information provides a good model of this, where the information officers may release 
information but an internal committee has to decide on refusals and be ready to defend such 
decisions in front of the Information Commission if they are subsequently appealed). It is 
recommended that the Montenegrin law make clear that while the Information Officer or other 
public official may release information in accordance with the law, without having to consult with 
 35 
superiors, only a designated person such as the head of the body may issue a refusal and that 
person will be personally liable for the refusal decision should it be found to be in breach of the 
provisions of the law.  
 
What should a refusal notice contain? The LFATI requires that government bodies issue a 
resolution on whether or not they will release information to a requestor. It is recommended that 
in the case the decision is to refuse to provide the information, the resolution must contain both 
the  particular  provision on which provides the grounds for the information to be withheld (it is 
not sufficient to cite Article 9 in general) as well as the rationale for the harm it would cause, and 
a demonstration that the public interest test has been considered. The refusal notice should also 
inform the requestor of the procedure for appeals (administrative appeal, information 
commission, courts, etc.) as well as any time frames within which such appeals should be 
initiated.   
 
Article 10 – Information that may never be restricted  
Article 10 is a laudable and welcome provision that establishes which information may never be 
exempted, even if such information would pose a threat to national security, defence or 
international relations (Article 9, paragraph 1). It reads:  
 
 Any government agency shall be in obligation to enable access to the information or to a 
part thereof, referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 9 of this Law, if such information 
contains data that obviously imply: disrespect to substantive regulations; unauthorized 
use of public resources; misuse of powers; unscrupulous performance of public duties; 
the existence of reasonable suspicions a criminal offence was committed; or the 
existence of the grounds for attacking a court judgment, regardless of the seriousness of 
damages caused  to the interests referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 9 of this Law.  
 
This paragraph has the potential to be a powerful tool in work to improve good, efficient and 
effective governance in Montenegro and to root out corruption. It is not at all clear, however, 
why this provision applies only to the national security/defence/international relations exemption 
and not to the remainder of Article 9. This is a similar concern to that identified with the ultimate 
paragraph of Article 9 (see above). After all there is much information related to questions of 
public safety, the economic policy of the state, crime prevention, etc., that may also reveal 
“unscrupulous performance of public duties” and where there would be a significant public 
interest in obtaining access to such information. There is absolutely no justification for limiting 
this expanded public interest provision to national security issues.  
 
We further note that other laws that have similar provisions often make reference to the 
following:  
• information on threats or actual harm to the environment  
• information that affects the life, health or safety of a person 
• information relating to previous, current or potential future violations of human rights  
 
We recommend that these classes of information be added to the list of information that may 
never be restricted contained in Article 10.  
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Partial Access Provisions – Article 13 
Article 13 establishes the forms of access to information once a request has been granted. It also 
makes reference to what is known as “partial access” or “severance”  which the Article 19 defines 
accordingly: “if any part of information is restricted, relevant government agency shall enable 
access to the information after deleting the part of such information that is restricted.”  
 
Article 13 goes on to specify that if partial access is applied to a document, it shall be indicated 
with the marking “deletion completed” and an indication of the extent of such a deletion. In 
cases where there has been a deletion, the only permissible form of access is by a transcript, 
photocopy or translation delivered to the requestor either in person, by mail or by e-mail.  
 
We recommend that it may be advisable to include a reference to partial access in Article 9 of 
the law and that Article 9 make clear that where some information in a document would damage 
a protected interest if released, and if there is no overriding public interest, then the public 
official must provide the requestor with the remainder of the document, after carrying out the 
appropriate deletions.  
 
Other Grounds for Denial of Information – Article 14 
Article 14 provides that government agencies shall not be obliged to provide information that has 
already been published or made available elsewhere in the country or on the Internet. In such 
cases the government body shall inform the requestor as to where the information may be found 
(such as “Official Gazette or other official organ or publication or printed media”).  
 
There is a problem with this provision in that it may result in, de facto at least, a requestor not 
having access to the information and thereby is in effect a denial of the information. Consider for 
example the requestor who does not have Internet access. Internet Penetration in Montenegro is 
cited as being 17.6 %, around half the current European average of 38.9%8. If this figure is 
correct, as many as 80% of the population may be denied access to information published on the 
Internet; even if the true figure is higher or given access to cyber cafes, it is almost certain that 
around 50% of the population will not have easy Internet access. It is therefore unacceptable 
simply to refer users to an Internet source without first checking if they have relatively easy 
access to the Internet.  
 
Similarly, although Montenegro is a small country, not all requestors may have easy access to all 
the official publications (getting access to a simple information that could be sent on one page by 
mail may require a full day’s journey to the capital Podgorica if a requestor living in a more 
remote area needs access to a particular official publication not contained in his or her local 
public library). The principle here should not be simply that the information has previously been 
published, but that it is genuinely easily accessible for the particular requestor concerned. Part of 
the duty to assist for each Information Officer referred to in the general analysis section on the 
LFATI should be to ensure that there the requestor can access the information and if not, to take 
the decision to provide a copy to him or her.  
 
Article 14 should be reformed to make clear that mere previous publication of information is not 
sufficient; rather the public official should ensure that the previously published information both 
(a) answers directly the information request  presented by the requestor and (b) is easily 
available to that particular person.  
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Recommendations for Reform of Article 9  
 It is recommended that Article 9 be reformed to make it clear that all possible grounds for 
exemptions be subject to both the harm and the public interest tests, ie: that the last 
paragraph of Article 9 should apply to all preceding paragraphs 1 through 7 (with a possible 
exemption of some parts of Article 6).  
 If maybe appropriate to move Article 9 paragraph 6 to a separate article on protection of 
privacy and personal data protection, with appropriate references to other data protection 
provisions when they are introduced in Montenegro (see general analysis of the LFATI).  
 It is recommended that Article 9 be amended to remove the language that implies that a 
particular class of information is exempt from disclosure, or information having a particular 
provenance or information already classified under some other (unspecified) legislation. In 
essence Article 9 should consist of a comprehensive enumeration of the permissible 
protected interests that justify restrictions on access to information along with the 
mechanism by which such restrictions may be applied.  
 Article 9 paragraph 7 should be amended to remove the references to documents under 
preparation and to clarify that the article is designed to protect internal deliberations and 
may be applied for limited periods of time (normally a period of a few days or no more than 
a few weeks).  
 Article 9 (or a related Article) should incorporate the requirement that while the Information 
Officer or other public official may release information in accordance with the law, without 
having to consult with superiors, only a designated person such as the head of the body 
may issue a refusal and that person will be personally liable for the refusal decision should 
it be found to be in breach of the provisions of the law.  
 Article 9 (or a related Article) should establish that in the case the decision is to refuse to 
provide the information, the resolution must contain both the particular provision on which 
provides the grounds for the information to be withheld (it is not sufficient to cite Article 9 
in general) as well as the rationale for the harm it would cause, and a demonstration that 
the public interest test has been considered. The refusal notice should also inform the 
requestor of the procedure for appeals (administrative appeal, information commission, 
courts, etc.) as well as any time frames within which such appeals should be initiated.   
Recommendation on Article 9 / Article 13 
 We recommend that it may be advisable to include a reference to partial access in Article 9 
of the law and that Article 9 make clear that where some information in a document would 
damage a protected interest if released, and if there is no overriding public interest, then 
the public official must provide the requestor with the remainder of the document, after 
carrying out the appropriate deletions.  
Recommendation on Article 10 
 We recommend additional classes of information (environment, life, health and safety, and 
human rights violations) be added to the list of information that may never be restricted 
contained in Article 10. 
Recommendation on Article 14 
 Article 14 should be reformed to make clear that mere previous publication of information is 
not sufficient; rather the public official should ensure that the previously published 
information both (a) answers directly the information request  presented by the requestor 
and (b) is easily available to that particular person.  
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2.3.  The Nature and Structure of State Secrets Laws 
 
Montenegro is on the point of adopting a state secrets law. It should be very clear therefore on 
the purposes of such a law. The primary aim of a state secrets law is to ensure that information 
that will cause harm to national interests (national security, territorial integrity, international 
relations, public safety) is protected in such a way that it does not fall into the wrong hands.  
 
The volume of information that should be protected by a state secrets law should be a tiny 
percentage of all the information held by government. There are two reasons for this. One is that 
the majority of information held by government will not cause serious harm to the national 
interests. In a modern democratic society all information that does not absolutely need to be 
kept secret should be automatically in the public domain. The second reason is that it is very 
hard to ensure that the real damaging information is kept secret if all information is liberally 
classified as “top secret” or “classified” – in such a case it becomes impossible to distinguish 
between the really harmful information and that which is actually quite benign.  
 
There is also a cost to keeping information secret: it requires special handling procedures, should 
be kept in secure locations, put in the safe or other secure storage overnight, only processed and 
read by those who have the appropriate level of security clearance. If a large volume of 
information has to be treated in such a way there are two possible outcomes: the first is that the 
information will not be properly handled and the risks of it falling into the wrong hands increase 
significantly. The second is that it is properly handled but that the cost of such and operation 
escalates dramatically.  
 
It is for this reason that the NATO document cited in Section I states:  
  “the classification assigned determines the physical security given to the information in 
storage and transmission, its circulation, destruction and the personnel security clearance 
required for access. Therefore both over-classification and under-classification should be 
avoided in the interests of effective security as well as efficiency.” 9 
 
These are also some of the reasons that the OSCE in its recommendations cited in Section I 
above states:  
“The definition of state secrets should be limited only to data that directly relate to the 
national security of the state and where their unauthorized release would have identifiable 
and serious consequences. Information designated as “Official” or “work secrets” should not 
be considered for classification as state secrets.” 
 
The purpose of a state secrets law should be, therefore, to establish the procedures for 
classifying information in order to ensure that information that genuinely needs to be limited in 
circulation is properly marked and handled.  
 
A typical state secrets law will include the following elements:  
• definition of the levels of classification, which are typically: Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, 
and Restricted (not forgetting the 5th category of unclassified which does not need to be 
marked on all documents as it is presumed if the document is not otherwise classified).  
• procedures for applying the classification – including who proposes and who approves the 
classification of a document, the issuance of “security certificates” or other authorization to 
confirm the classification.  
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• procedures for applying classification to a document containing more than one level of secret 
• rules for applying time limits to the classification (and automatic declassification) 
• rules on the periodic review of classification 
• the procedures for handling and protecting classified, ensuring it is protected from 
unauthorized disclosure. The management procedures will include how such information is 
identified, controlled, transferred, transmitted, retrieved, indexed, archived, and/or 
eventually destroyed. Such procedures include how to ensure the physical security of 
locations where classified information is held in order to prevent access by unauthorized 
persons.  
• particular measures that related to the handling of classified information that is held in 
electronic form and therefore requires particular resources for its storage, transmission, 
processing, use, and sharing. The security of the information systems will involve special 
protection against unauthorized access to or modification of the classified information. There 
will need to be special considerations given to the protection of related computer hardware 
and software.  
• the procedures for issuing security clearance to personnel who will handle classified 
information. This can be complex because different levels of classification imply different 
levels of security clearance; whilst a small number of people may have access to a top secret 
document, a larger number may have access to one that is confidential or restricted. The 
state secrets law will also give consideration to the automatic security clearance of those 
elected to high government office. 
• creation of an oversight body, which as the OSCE recommends should be “an independent 
body that is not part of the intelligence, military or security services should have oversight 
over classified information and ensure that the system is operating properly, receive 
complaints about improperly classified information and review and order the declassification 
of information.” 
 
A good state secrets law will complement and in no way contradict an access to information law. 
The state secrets law merely identifies the procedures for handling and protecting information 
that has been identified as potentially damaging to the national security interest. An access to 
information law on the other hand regulates the right of access to information. In a well 
functioning democratic system, it is relatively rare that a request for information actually seeks 
access to information that, properly classified, is marked as “top secret” or “secret”. For example, 
requestors do not normally seek to know the details of the current system for codifying sensitive 
messages used within the military. Hence, where information classification is properly applied, it 
will be very clear which information should and should not enter the public domain. There will 
however be occasions when a requestor seeks information that has been classified. This might 
be because the requestor believes that there is a public interest in knowing the information or 
(as is often the case) the classification has been made for political rather than security reasons. 
In such cases it is imperative that the request for information be given due consideration under 
the access to information law and that the requestor has a right to appeal any refusal to higher 
bodies and eventually to the courts. No information should automatically be excluded from 
consideration under the access to information law merely because it has been classified 
according to the state secrets law.  
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2.4. Protection of Commercial Interests and Business Secrets 
 
The aim of protecting commercial interests is to ensure that there is a level playing field and that 
businesses can maintain a fair competitive advantage based on their investment of skill, 
research, and resources into developing and marketing their products.  
 
The Council of Europe Recommendation establishes an exemption for “commercial and other 
economic interests”, and explains these as, “for example business matters which need to be kept 
secret for competition reasons, such as the confidential nature of business negotiations.” 
 
Generally speaking, commercial interests is a broader term than trade secrets which are closely 
guarded secrets giving significant competitive edge, such as the secret formula for Coca Cola. 
Definition of these concepts becomes rather difficult when trying to compare between legal 
regimes, because of nuances of difference between different regimes, but it is clear that a 
“trade” or “business” secret is a much narrower concept than “commercial interests”. Often 
“trade secrets” will be subject to a legal regime that requires them to be registered in order to be 
able to enforce subsequent legal protection, as with patents and trademarks and other forms of 
copyright.  
 
What is also clear is that not all information which gives companies a competitive advantage 
should remain out of the public domain. Most businesses have to file some form of annual report 
and accounts and some of this information is in the public domain in the majority of countries, 
with a significantly larger amount of information being available to shareholders and hence the 
public for publicly-listed companies (companies listed on the stock exchange in any particular 
country).  
 
A wide range of other information about private businesses routinely enters the public domain. 
For example, if it is found that a company that manufactures consumer electronic products 
(televisions or refrigerators for example) has been seriously and repeatedly polluting the 
environment, this information could hurt the reputation and therefore the sales of the company, 
but this is evident that the public that has the right to the information and to make choices based 
on being fully informed.  
 
Similarly, in the USA, the local newspapers regularly carry information about which kitchens have 
been fined the previous month for failing health inspections of their kitchens. Such information 
will almost inevitably lead to a decline of customers going to the restaurant, thereby hurting the 
business, but it is also evident why the information should enter the public domain.  
 
In Argentina, a 2004 nightclub fire in which 175 people died and over 700 were injured, many of 
them seriously, caused a scandal when it became clear that the venue did not have the licence 
for a large-scale event and was not following fire-procedures correctly. As a reaction, people 
started filing access to information requests with other venues to gather information about the 
nature of the licences they had obtained, actions which gave a boost to the campaign for a full 
access to information law.  
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Nevertheless, a great deal of information about the functioning, financial and personnel 
structures of private companies will remain private under normal circumstances. This changes 
radically when a company enters into a financial relationship with a public body, such as with a 
public procurement contract.  
 
The principle here is the same as when a public official enters office: while a private individual 
has the right to keep secret certain information such as about their assets, income, business 
dealings, etc., confidential, someone who puts themselves forward for public office cannot expect 
the same level of privacy. So, for example, holders of public office and more senior public official 
have to declare their assets and interests.  
 
This holds too for private companies that when they enter into a relationship with public bodies 
and receive public funds, must expect that there is some level of scrutiny. This scrutiny is 
justified because in these cases the balance between the commercial confidentiality interests of 
the company are outweighed by the public interest in transparency in the spending of public 
funds.  
 
Commercial interests vs. public procurement transparency 
 
Emerging standards indicate that the limits of commercial confidentiality are significantly 
narrower when  a private company does business with government. In addition to the law and 
practice in many European Countries, a number of important cases by Information 
Commissioners have ruled that commercial information should be released in the interest of 
transparency of a public procurement contract and to enable the public to know how its funds 
are being spent.  
 
Irish Case on Pricing Structures in Contracts 
 
In 2003, the Irish freedom of information commissioner ruled that information in contracts 
between the government and private companies could be made public, even if it had the 
potential to damage the competitive edge of that company.10 
 
The case arose from a request filed under Ireland’s 1997 Freedom of Information Act for a 
contract between Ireland’s Department of Finance and financial advisors, ABN Amro and McCann 
FitzGerald Solicitors, that amounted to €850,247, which the commissioner noted was a “large 
amount of public money.” 
 
The total amounts paid had already been made available by the minister of finance (see Table 
5), but the requestors wanted details of the contract. The financial advisors objected to the 
contract being made public because it would reveal their fee and pricing structure which, they 
claimed, would give competitors an advantage. 
 
The Irish information commissioner ruled that once the contract had been signed, “The 
successful tender information lost confidentiality with respect to the fee rates and other details 
necessary to understand the nature of the services contracted for.” He concluded that this was 
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true, even if harmful to the competitive position of the affected parties: “On balance, the public 
interest was better served by the release of this information in light of the significant need for 
openness and accountability in relation to the contract.” 
 
Slovenian Case on Access to Contracts 
 
In another precedent-setting case, the Slovenian information commissioner confirmed that 
procurement contracts between public bodies and private suppliers are public information, except 
where trade secrets that give a competitive advantage are concerned.11 The case resulted from 
an information request filed on February 22, 2004 by a member of the public who asked for a 
copy of the agreement between the municipality and a private company, ALPDOM Inženiring, for 
management of apartments blocks owned by the municipality. 
 
The Municpality of Radovljica rejected the request on the grounds that it was confidential under 
Slovenia’s 1993 Companies Act. The municipality also cited Article 6 of Slovenia’s Access to 
Information Act, which provides for protection of trade secrets. 
 
The requestor appealed, arguing that the agreement had to be freely available, to allow public 
participation in the decisions relating to the management of publicly-owned housing. A 
supplementary concern was that a manager of ALPDOM Inženiring was also the deputy-mayor of 
the local municipality, hence there was a clear intermingling of public and private interests. 
 
The information commissioner ruled that the contract should be released.  
 
The Slovenian Information Commissioner’s Principles 
 
The Slovenian Information commissioner citied a number of grounds that reflect comparative 
standards for public procurement contract transparency: 
• information in a contract that does not impact on the competitive market position of the 
selected provider cannot be considered a trade secret; 
• data cannot be defined as a trade secret if other laws require it to be public (in this case the 
Slovenian Public Procurement Act of 2000); 
• data cannot be defined as a trade secret if it relates to violations of law or breaches of good 
business practices; 
• an entire contract cannot be considered a trade secret as part of the information contained 
in a contract has to be made public during the bidding process; 
• the total financial value of the contract cannot be reserved; 
• the object of the tender & description of services/goods to be supplied cannot be reserved; 
• supporting references must be made public, as they relate to compliance with the 
procurement conditions and criteria; 
• assessment of eligibility and compliance criteria cannot be reserved, as these are an 
essential component of awarding a public contract, and the public has the right to know 
whether the selection procedure has been carried out correctly and whether the selected 
bidder made the best possible offer. 
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The information commissioner also noted that, in addition to the above considerations, 
information may only be considered a trade secret if it has been specified as such by the supplier 
and if it does not relate directly to the procurement at issue. The commissioner recommended 
that, if bidders declare large parts of the information they submit to be trade secrets, the 
contracting agency should exclude the bids. Where contracts contain some genuine trade 
secrets, the information must be severed, either physically removed or crossed out, or 
electronically deleted in a password-protected form in order to permit the remainder of the 
information to be released. 
 
UK Standards on Private and Public Commercial Interests 
 
A similar principle applies in the UK. The guidance issued by the Information Commissioner’s 
Office in Freedom of Information Awareness Guidance No. 2 reinforces the advice given by the 
Lord Chancellor’s on the handling of information requests:  
 
When entering into contracts public authorities should refuse to include contractual terms 
which purport to restrict the disclosure of information held by the authority and relating to 
the contract beyond the restrictions permitted by the Act. Public authorities cannot "contract 
out" of their obligations under the Act. Unless an exemption provided for under the Act is 
applicable in relation to any particular information, a public authority will be obliged to 
disclose that information in response to a request, regardless of the terms of any contract.  
 
In some cases, the  public authority itself may claim that it has commercial interests to protect. 
This arose in a case in the UK when a public body (a publicly funded art gallery the National 
Maritime Museum, refused to reveal the amount of money it was paying to artists exhibiting at 
the museum, saying that this would damage its negotiating position with other artists. The UK’s 
Information Tribunal (a court which hears appeals against decisions of the Information 
Commissioner) ruled that the given that each case and each negotiation is likely to be slightly 
different the risk cannot be assumed to exist and stated: “We have accordingly concluded that 
no sufficient risk of prejudices to the commercial interests of National Maritime Museum was 
demonstrated to justify the exemption”. There was clearly an overriding public interest in 
knowing how the public funds were spent and how much the artists were receiving for their 
shows.  
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Montenegro’s Exemptions on Commercial Confidentiality  
 
Article 9 of Montenegro’s LFATI at paragraph 3 states that information may be refused if it would 
cause significant harm to:  
 
4) commercial and other private or public economic benefits, through disclosing the 
information: 
a. relating to financial, monetary or commercial operations of the State with other 
states, international organizations or other legal or natural entities; 
b. that are business secrets;  
c. contained in a separate law on the confidentiality of data; 
 
The first clause of Article 9 paragraph 3 is in line with the standards of the Council of Europe and 
with Regulation 1049 Regulation 1049/2001 on access to EU documents which permits 
exemptions in order to protect the “commercial interests of a natural or legal person … unless 
there is an overriding public interest in disclosure (Art. 4).” 
 
However, as with other articles in the exemptions section of Montenegro’s law, the additional 
clauses are somewhat problematic. Sub-paragraph 3(a) seems to confuse the traditional concept 
of commercial interests with that the State’s financial or monetary policy and with international 
relations. It is an unnecessary duplication and confusion of the initial clause of Paragraph 3 and 
should be deleted.  
 
Sub-paragraph 3(b) is legitimate as a mention assuming that (a) business secrets in the term of 
trade secrets (the formula for Coca Cola) are clearly and narrowly defined in Montenegrin law 
and that each request for information takes into consideration the public interest in the 
information as set out above. In particular, it should be clear the difference between “business 
secrets” in private business operations and the need to disclose information when a business 
enters into a contract with the government. In order for this to be achieved, the public interest 
text needs to be extended to apply to Paragraph 3 as we have already recommended in Section 
II above. 
 
Sub-paragraph 3.c is highly problematic. It makes a general reference to another law. It is not 
clear to use if this legislation currently exists. In any case, as argued in Section II above, the 
LFATI cannot make a blanket deferral to another law. Certain types of confidentiality may be 
protected (lawyer-client privilege for example) but that should be included as one of the  
protected interests under this law and subject to the public interest test.  
 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
• To bring Article 9 paragraph 3 into line with the Council of Europe standards, all but the 
first clause should be deleted.  
• If it does not yet have one, Montenegro needs a well-drafted law on trade or business 
secrets.  
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